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## **CASH TRANSFER PROGRAMS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: THE EMERGENCE OF THE NEW WELFARE STATES?**

### **Abstract**

Over the last few decades, across the Global South, there has been a rapid expansion of extensive social welfare programs targeting low-income people. This rise of social protection in Latin American countries and across Southern Africa has been praised as being “the really big development story of the last twenty years” (J. Ferguson) and as a “development revolution from the Global South” (Barrientos, Hanlon, and Hulme). Social policy became a “key domain of policy innovation” in the Global South. The new thinking was deeply rooted in a conviction that it is better to give money to poor people directly so that they can find the most effective ways to escape from poverty themselves, rather than build government (or philanthropic) for such purposes. Millions of poor citizens, previously ignored by the state, have become direct beneficiaries of cash transfer programs, that are non-contributory and paid directly from state treasury, being nominally conditional on an income test.

The new modalities of distribution in the Global South were associated with

both new kinds of political claim-making and new possibilities for political mobilization. One of the novelties of new social assistance programs can be seen in abandoning one of the main conceptions of traditional welfare states: traditional social payments are conceived as instrument for dealing with (short) interruptions adult heads of households cannot earn wages to support their families. The new cash transfer programs start from a different understanding of what constitutes a ‘normal’ situation in the Global South, the fact of mass, structural unemployment, supposing that social support is needed only for “dependent” categories. In Southern Africa, South Africa has led the way with an extensive national system of social payments, anchored by old age pensions, childcare grants, and disability payments. Other countries from the region followed suit. It is by now well documented that cash transfer programs worked and have a “positive development impact”. Considering the impact of cash transfer programs on individuals and households, the evidence suggests that those benefits

are often go beyond a program's core objectives.

Unfortunately, despite the unambiguous successes of the cash transfer programmes as well as the broad acceptance they enjoy across nearly the whole range of society, they are still nonetheless restricted by a conservative understanding of "deserving" and "non-deserving poor", and therefore they do not offer any benefits to working age, able-bodied men. The main goal of the article is to understand and explore the political as well as social significance of these new developments in Southern Africa, especially regarding the potential introduction of a universal basic income grant, but also in providing an input into ongoing discussions on the reforms of development aid provided in the region.

**Keywords:** social protection, Global South, South Africa, cash transfers

## INTRODUCTION

Over the last few decades, across the Global South, there has been a rapid expansion of social welfare programs targeting low-income people. The rise of social protection programmes in Latin American countries and across Southern Africa has been celebrated as a "development revolution from the Global South" (Barrientos, Hanlon, and Hulme, 2010) and "the really big development story of the last twenty years" (Ferguson, 2015). Social policy became a "key domain of policy innovation" (Ferguson, 2015) in the Global South.

The central mechanism of the new anti-poverty programs is not credit, se-

curitization, or any other sort of neo-liberal predation, but a strikingly simple device for handing out small amounts of money to people deemed to need it (Ferguson, 2015: 2). This new development was deeply rooted in a common-sense conviction that it is better to give money to poor people directly so that they can find the most effective ways to escape from poverty themselves, rather than to allocate it according to what policy makers think makes sense. Millions of poor citizens, previously ignored and overlooked, or intentionally marginalized by the state, have become direct beneficiaries of cash transfer programs. These programs are non-contributory and paid directly from the state treasury, being only nominally conditional on an income test. They are not temporary safety nets, or charity handouts. They are broadly based, covering a significant part of the low-income and vulnerable population. They are context-dependent which means that their design is shaped by history, current political and economic circumstances, and available resources as well as desired outcomes.

The new programs represented a paradigmatic shift in thinking on poverty reduction. They have been seen as a "southern challenge" (Barrientos, Hanlon, and Hulme, 2010) to a "tyranny of experts" (Easterly, 2014) and to the international development industry which has been suggesting for a long time that with the right mix of technical, top-down solutions, necessarily coming from the West, the most severe develop-

ment challenges of the Global South can be resolved.

These new modalities of distribution were associated with both new kinds of political claim-making and new possibilities for political mobilization (Ferguson, 2015: 14). One of the novelties of these new social assistance programs was abandoning some of the fundamental conceptions of traditional welfare states: social payments are conceived as instruments for dealing with temporary interruptions when heads of households are prevented from earning wages to support their families. The new cash transfer programs are based on a different understanding of what constitutes a 'normal' situation in the Global South where countries are struggling with mass structural unemployment and widespread poverty (see Vidojević and Chipkin, 2022)

In Southern Africa, South Africa has led the way, introducing a highly developed and sophisticated national system of social payments. In a domino effect, other countries from the region followed suit and there are now similar national programs in all Southern African countries, irrespective of their level of development. It is by now well researched and documented that cash transfer programs work and have a "positive development impact". Considering the impact of cash transfer programs on individuals, households, and local communities the evidence unambiguously suggests that those benefits often go beyond a program's core objectives. Four conclusions emerge repeatedly: the programs

are affordable, recipients use the money well and do not waste it, cash transfers are an efficient way to directly reduce current poverty, and they have the potential to prevent future poverty by facilitating economic growth and human development (Hanlon and Barrientos and Hulme, 2010: 2). Unfortunately, despite their successes, cash transfer programs are still nonetheless restricted and framed by a conservative understanding of the "deserving" and "non-deserving poor", which has blocked their take-up more widely and also has local exclusionary consequences, particularly for working age, able-bodied, men. The main goal of the article is to understand and explore the political as well as social significance of these new developments in Southern Africa, especially regarding the potential introduction of a universal basic income grant, and to contribute to ongoing discussions on the reforms of development aid provided in the region.

### **The rise of cash transfer programs in Southern Africa**

Historically, social protection in Africa was predominantly focused on risk management, particularly on food aid, food insecurity and famine or disaster relief and therefore organized and implemented through humanitarian and emergency assistance (Barrientos and Hulme and Nino-Zarazua, 2009). Until recently, social assistance hardly seemed to be on the agenda for a continent with its "weak states" characterised by limited fiscal capacity, weak public institutions, bureaucratic dysfunction and

widespread corruption. Informal networks traditionally played a crucial role in providing safety nets for their members in need, compensating for the lack of a public social security system. At the beginning of the 1990s, the “winds of change” started blowing across the Global South, and social policy, and social protection in particular, underwent a major transformation. Large southern economies led the way. Against the background of economic crisis, failed structural adjustment programmes and the sharp rise of poverty and vulnerability that followed, Mexico, Brazil, South Africa, India, China, and Indonesia increasingly focused on re-defining their social protection agendas around cash transfer programs.

Africa, and particularly Southern Africa, arrived at such programs via their own route, and due to their own particular historical circumstances, trying to respond to challenges specific to the region. The combination of multiple shocks and the deterioration of informal safety nets weakened traditional emergency responses and led some countries to begin rediscovering the value of social protection and start introducing cash transfer programs. The region is characterised by comparatively high levels of extreme, chronic and multidimensional poverty and vulnerability, an immediate legacy of the colonial and Apartheid period, compounded since 1994 by poor policy decisions especially in response to the HIV/AIDS pandemic, characterized by denial and obfuscation. The effects of HIV/AIDS, various ethnic and

political conflicts, intensified migration, and increased urbanisation have led to demographic changes at levels not experienced in other parts of the world (Garcia and Moore, 2012). The region also suffers from less developed markets, weaker public institutions, and greater political instability than other parts of the Global South. In contrast with Latin America and the Caribbean, at least in the short term, livelihoods and exit from poverty in most African countries are inextricably linked to smallholder agriculture and the informal economy and less to engagement with the formal wage economy (Davies et al, 2012).

The design of programs that have been introduced varied, depending on the level of social development, available institutional infrastructure, perceived needs and priorities and popular expectations and pressures, as well as local political dynamics and challenges. One of the most obvious differences between early programs implemented in Latin American countries and programs that were introduced on the African continent, was that Latin American programs were conditional, while in Africa programs are predominantly unconditional, especially those that have been introduced after 2000. Conditional cash transfers provide benefits only to beneficiaries who have fulfilled pre-defined (soft) conditions, also known as co-responsibilities, while unconditional programs provide benefits to specific categories with no strings attached. The most common conditions include the requirement that children regularly attend

school and receive prescribed medical check-ups, or, alternatively, that a household adult attends educational seminars covering basic nutrition, health, and other topics (Garcia and Moore, 2012). None of these conditions are present in the second kind of program.

Whether or not cash transfer programs should be conditional has been, and still is, a heavily contested issue. What comes out of the rigorous evaluations that are usually attached to cash transfer programs, however, is that “there is almost no evidence that conditions make any major difference” (Hanlon and Barrientos and Hulme, 2010: 131). Regardless of their nature, the expansion of cash transfer programs significantly increased the demand for services. With poor or non-existent public infrastructure, a “supply side” problem, introducing co-responsibilities before securing good quality services means that potential beneficiaries would be unfairly penalized. Also, the way conditions are usually defined implies, perhaps unintentionally, that beneficiaries are irrational or incapable of acting in their own best interests. There is a further consideration: imposing conditionalities increases the cost of the whole program, both for government, which must put in place an entire public administration to administer them, and for individuals that must prove their eligibility before they can participate.

Cash transfer programs provide non-contributory cash grants (they have no reference to employment histories) to selected beneficiaries to satisfy mini-

mum consumption needs. They typically target beneficiaries in extreme and/or chronic poverty or people belonging to vulnerable groups. Most of the programs provide benefits to female rather than to male adult household members, expecting to increase women’s bargaining power within the household, while also hoping to improve children’s well-being. The programs are transparent, perceived as fair and necessary, which makes them acceptable across nearly the whole of society. Most of the programs, especially those that were implemented after 2000, are accompanied by experimental, or non-experimental but rigorous, impact evaluations (Davies et al, 2012).

A comprehensive World Bank review reveals that today there are more than 100 various cash transfer programs in operation across the African continent (Garcia and Moore, 2012). In 2006, an African Union Conference issued the “Livingstone Call for Action”, arguing that every African country should have social transfer programmes (Hanlon, Barrientos and Hulme, 2010). After careful examination of the existing programs, Garcia, and Moore (2012) make a distinction between programs that are developed in middle-income countries and ones that were introduced in low-income or fragile countries, which corresponds to the distinction made by Nino-Zarazua and others (2010) between what they call the “Southern African model” and the “Middle African Model”.

The Southern African model began earlier and has a long-term focus. It corresponds to rights-based cash transfers awarded on categorical criteria. These programs are domestically funded and based in government institutions and have strong legislative backing. The coverage of the program is wide and usually covers a significant part of the vulnerable population. Within the Middle African model, programs are usually initiated and supported by donors, and therefore they usually lack local ownership and coordination, while their coverage is often limited to only certain vulnerable groups. Regardless of the context and the design, due to rigorous evaluations, it is safe to argue that cash transfer programs have had positive effects on poverty and inequality, school enrolment and attendance, health, especially among children, and per capita consumption (Hulme, Barrientos & Hanlon, 2010; Garcia & Moore, 2012; Davies et al, 2012). They generate potential economic benefits, such as improving recipients' ability to manage risk and insecurity, facilitate savings and investment, and support the development of local markets. They also help to empower recipients in a wider social context (Du Toit, 2009). Whatever their precise targets are, most cash transfers are shared across the family, but with an emphasis on children and their nutrition, education, and health. Symbolically, cash transfer programs serve as an important part of the renewed social compact between citizens and the state (Du Toit et al, 2009).

### **A Closer look at Social Grants in South Africa**

South Africa is a highly unequal middle-income country. Poverty and mass structural unemployment are among the main challenges facing post-apartheid South Africa. Many of its citizens still live under conditions of moderate to extreme poverty. Fifty percent of South Africans live below the poverty line, while around 30% of the population lives in households defined as ultra-poor (Seekings and Nattrass, 2015). Unfortunately, a large majority of Black South Africans have not experienced substantial economic benefit from the democratic transition (Fine et al, 2019). This situation has been aggravated by the economic consequences of the Covid 19 pandemic. Poverty persisted in South Africa after 1994 because economic growth was neither rapid enough nor sufficiently inclusive to create work for low skilled, unemployed, men and women. In fact, the South African economy, and employment rates, have largely slowed down since the 1970s, and its integration into the world market resulted in declining industrialisation and employment (Marais, 2011). There was a brief period of rapid growth immediately after the end of Apartheid, but since 2008 the economy has returned to long-term patterns of low growth and mass, structural, unemployment. Though democracy saw expansion of the Black middle class and brought significant improvements in the living standards of many South Africans, the middle class is today increasingly precarious as the

economy has faltered (see Chipkin, 2016).

In 1994, the African National Congress (ANC) government inherited a state that, from a social policy perspective, was unusual in Africa (Hassim, 2006; Seekings and Natrass, 2015). The late apartheid state had expanded access to welfare services, even to Black South Africans. The ANC government increased the coverage of old age pension for Africans and African employees were allowed access to employer subsidised healthcare. In South Africa, as in other settler colonies, in matters of social policy two government systems were established. For whites, a version of a Beveridge-type social policy was developed. Black South Africans participated in this scheme, albeit on unequal terms. The South African welfare state represented a bizarre reconciliation of the British welfare model with apartheid policy where the distinction between the “deserving” and “undeserving” poor was mainly, although not exclusively, marked by race (Hassim, 2006). The system was buttressed by the general assumption that certain categories of individuals could be “morally excused from work”, on account of their assumed vulnerable status or conditions, thus qualifying as worthy poor. Others were considered responsible for their own poverty which exempted them from collective support. Historically, able-bodied individuals belonged to the latter group. African exclusion from welfare was justified on the grounds that “people accustomed to modern lifestyles

and consumption patterns have greater need for social protection than those in rural substance agriculture who were not proletarianized and therefore should be presumed to be better placed to meet traditional subsistence needs” (Van Der Berg, 1997: 486). As mentioned above, however, Black South Africans were included in a few social support programs but on unequal terms. A racially unequal system of pensions and grants was deracialized, and benefits were equalized in the years just before the official end of apartheid in 1994.

Several factors determined the direction of welfare reforms. Of crucial importance was ANC ideology, but also the great expectations that came with the end of apartheid. “The ANC placed high value on labour as the central model of social incorporation and on the “workers” as the figuration of those to whom the government must answer” (Ferguson, 2015: 9). In this context, a patchwork of older social assistance programs was the starting point for the development of an institutional apparatus that would enable the new state to provide highly visible and often very effective support, in the form of direct cash transfers, to its electoral base - a way of “delivering” something tangible and valuable, even in the absence of jobs (Ferguson, 2015: 10-11). Given the country’s economic trajectory it was simply not possible to start from the latent or overt assumption of full or near-full employment amongst Africans and African breadwinners. Incredibly, how-

ever, this awareness did not follow into the field of social policy.

Despite many promises, reforms after 1994 were largely “parametric”, meaning that the parameters of existing programs were adjusted or slightly re-defined (Seekings and Nattrass, 2015), leaving in place a comprehensive social grants system, within which the state old age grant, social grants for children and social grants for people with disabilities are the most important ones. The social welfare system in South Africa, largely an extension of apartheid-era provisions, presupposes full or, at least, high employment. There are no instruments that provide for long-term unemployed persons, especially those in the age-group 15–24 or those over 50, where unemployment is concentrated. Moreover, there are no welfare provisions for the millions of South Africans who are not economically active. Trying to reach those who are in the most difficult situation, the state gives almost 19 million people social grants, which is almost twice as many people as those who can access income from waged work (James and Neves, 2020). The grants appear to be relatively well targeted towards eligible poor households, with estimates suggesting that, by the early 2010s, about 76% of grant payments were going to the poorest 40% of the population (Marais, 2022: 49-50). A biometric system of identification is used, and payments are made via cash advances that can be collected at automatic bank teller machines.

There is now a large body of research, both qualitative and quantitative, examining the effectiveness of social grants and trying to answer how recipients use their grants and what effect they have on individuals, families, and communities. Empirical studies confirm that social grants in South Africa “support consumption and improve the welfare of recipients and broader households” (du Toit, 2009). Available data suggests that social grants facilitate investment in human capital (nutrition, education, and health) but also investments in productive assets and activities (du Toit, 2009; Davies et al, 2012; James and Neves, 2020). Social grants are associated with improvements in the quality and quantity of food consumption which improves nutritional status and lowers documented levels of morbidity and stunting, which is an important development outcome (Devereux, 2011). After food, social grant recipients spent their money on school fees, school uniforms and electricity (Delany et al, 2008). They also tend to use their money to improve their homes. Social grants facilitate savings and investment, they also allow their beneficiaries to access and leverage other resources and finances (du Toit, 2009). However, a recent study conducted by James and Neves (2020) showed that this issue needs to be managed carefully, if not it makes social grant recipients extremely susceptible to predatory lending with potentially devastating consequences. Social grants contribute to the strengthening of existing informal social protec-

tion systems by enabling beneficiaries to enter and participate in existing systems of social reciprocity and mutuality. Data also shows that social grants sustain and support the development of local markets by increasing purchasing power in economically marginalised areas. Whilst South Africa's social grants system has been efficient across a whole range of areas, the fact that it does not include those aged 18 to 59 with no or little income raises the question of its adequacy and the urgency of reform. Many unemployed working age adults must survive on casual and precarious work in the informal economy with no prospects of being integrated into the formal labour market in future. They usually congregate around their mothers or grandmothers who receive grants to have access to more reliable income (James and Neves, 2020). This exclusion comes at huge costs, and it is no longer sustainable.

### **Instead of a conclusion: dreaming BIG**

“The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity” (Ludwig Wittgenstein quoted in *The Reality Bubble* by Z. Tong, 2019.)

The success of cash transfer programs shows that peripheries are not “crises-prone entities” in endless need for supervision and guidance, confined to a mere “servile imitation” of modes of life and political organisation invented and developed elsewhere. Despite

the challenges they are facing, they are also places of innovative thinking, especially within the public policy space. Cash transfer programs have been hugely successful, and empirical evidence from Southern Africa, but also other parts of the Global South, strongly suggest that they contribute to powerful improvements across a whole range of development indicators. However, due to the dramatic worsening of economic and political trends over the last two decades, the “safety net” that they provide is becoming increasingly insufficient. The current moment requires radical thinking and bold decision making that will avoid “quick fixes” and “parametric adjustments” and critically challenge the main assumptions about waged work. “What if we posit that, in the present moment, it is the Global South that affords privileged insights into the workings of the world at large?” as Jean and John Comaroff suggest (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2012: 1).

Southern Africa is definitely “ahead of its time”. On the one hand, it presents a grim example of global trends, with its large working age population “surplus” to the labour needs of the economy, high levels of poverty and widening inequality, mirrored in lack of access to health care and education. For the vast majority of low and semi-skilled workers, working life comprises of short periods of employment bracketed by long periods of unemployment (Marais, 2022). Wage labour no longer serves either as the main basis of social membership or as the main safeguard from poverty.

Even the most optimistic prognosis and scenarios acknowledge that a significant part of the working age population will not be integrated into the formal labour market. Precarity became “the condition of our time” and the promise of stability and progress cannot be taken as given. There is a great urgency to identify and develop new forms of socio-economic membership that will be easily assessable to all citizens. On the other hand, Southern Africa is a site of important welfare experimentation, potentially with global lessons.

The idea of basic income has recently re-entered the mainstream and it is now “trending” in the Global North, but also in the Global South. Basic income is seen as a potentially efficient remedy for economic and social distress in the aftermath of economic crisis. Over the last few decades, especially since the economic crisis of 2008, capitalism has become highly unstable and prone to crisis. Unemployment and underemployment are high and growing, while new jobs are mostly irregular, poorly paid and lacking in benefits and security (Marais, 2022). These trends have worsened during the Covid 19 crisis. People reliant on insecure forms of employment and informal networks of support have suffered the most. Advocating for basic income has a long history during which the concept itself has significantly evolved. What all contemporary basic income proposals have in common is that they advocate cash payments to individuals on an unconditional basis. The main purpose of such programs is

to provide a guaranteed minimum level of income to *all citizens* thereby ensuring their economic security. It is a modest amount of money paid regularly and automatically.

South African interest in the basic income grant started quite early, in the late 1990s. Much of the momentum came from civil society organizations. The UBIG campaign was clever and sophisticated. Ferguson (2010: 176) points to some surprising ways in which certain discursive “moves”, that can be easily identified as neo-liberal, were put in place to work in the service of pro-poor and pro-welfare political arguments. The South African Government appointed the Taylor Committee to investigate a comprehensive system of social security for the country. The Committee’s report was published in April 2002. It was critical of Western welfare models, which tended to assume full or near full employment and reproduced the distinction between “deserving” and “undeserving” poor (Department of Social Development, 2002). It also recommended the introduction of a universal and unconditional basic income grant. The South African government, however, argued that “conditions for an immediate implementation of a basic income grant do not exist. There is a need to first put in place appropriate capacity and institutional arrangements to ensure effective implementation.”

The findings and recommendations of the Committee were met with scepticism. Some of the main concerns were related to the question of affordabil-

ity and administrative feasibility, but the proposal also faced resistance and hostility arising from the wide ideological gap between interested parties, which echoed the concerns expressed elsewhere in the world. The ANC was worried about creating a “dependency culture”. ‘State handouts’ were stigmatized. ANC officials continuously repeated that they preferred the “dignity of work” over “unconditional handouts to the poor”. Even if government policy at the time did not assume that those on welfare were necessarily lazy, the laziness discourse haunted government initiatives. Surprisingly, it was also widespread amongst “transitional losers”, those who failed to make it into the “first” economy. Dawson and Fouksman (2020), in their work on the views of unemployed or marginally employed, able-bodied young men in urban South Africa (what they call “surplus” populations), found that most had adopted the “laziness narrative” to explain their own economic marginalization.

The Cabinet did not take a position on the Report and its main recommendations. The ANC was due to hold a policy conference in September 2002 and a national conference in December of the same year. At the December Conference, the idea of the UBIG was rejected, although no formal decision was ever taken by government (Matisonn and Seekings, 2002: 134). The reluctance to embrace and implement the Report’s recommendation revealed a deep misunderstanding of the South African economy and one of the most pressing

problems that South African society was facing: mass structural unemployment. Economic and social policies in South Africa, and elsewhere in the region, continue to embody the idea that waged work is a viable and sufficiently available basis for avoiding poverty and pursuing fulfilling lives (Marais, 2022). Social welfare is still constructed on the foundation of an idealised, able-bodied, breadwinner, while those requiring social intervention are a kind of photographic negative of wage-earning men (Ferguson, 2015: 158) Nevertheless, the idea of a Universal Basic Income Grant is still very popular in many political parties, including the opposition Democratic Alliance (DA), and has recently been taken up again by well organised civil society bodies. At stake is the development of South Africa’s system of unconditional cash grants into a fully-fledged UBIG.

Following closely the way the South African UBIG drama unfold, a similar proposal gained momentum in neighbouring Namibia. The campaign for the introduction of basic income in Namibia was launched in the early 2000s and, like in South Africa, was driven by a civil society coalition. After years of campaigning and fundraising, a pilot project was launched in 2008. “The small amount of money (\$7 per month) was provided between January 2008 and December 2009 to every child and adult not already in receipt of an old age pension in Otjivero-Omitara, a poor multi-ethnic village about one hundred kilometres east of the capital

city Windhoek with a total population of one thousand. Child malnutrition, poverty and petty crime declined, and the payments of school and clinic fees increased after the introduction of the basic income” (Haarmann and Haarmann and Natrass, 2019: 358). Since the program was carefully monitored and evaluated, what they showed is that people used the money to buy food, repair their homes, purchase livestock. The payment of school fees more than doubled, and non-attendance at school fell by 42% and there was a growth in small business activity as well as labour market participation (ibid: 362). However, despite overwhelmingly positive outcomes, basic income never gained sufficient support in government to be implemented. It was disregarded as “too simplistic” by the ruling party. Rather, the government took a predictable and familiar path. The number of government departments was expanded while developmental spending decisions were framed as efforts to improve the lives of the poor by targeted assistance and through economic growth. Military spending increased and became one of the highest shares of government spending in the world (Haarmann and Haarmann and Natrass, 2019: 369). The Namibian basic income pilot represented an important case study since it was very suggestive about the potential impact of a basic income on poverty but also more generally on development within the Southern African context. The case study also revealed local political dynamics that necessarily follow

such initiatives, as well as contrasting interpretations and arguments that need to be addressed.

Despite the rich empirical body of research from the region but also from around the world that unambiguously supports the idea of a basic income grant, decision-makers in Southern Africa, and elsewhere around the world, are still not ready to step out of their reality bubble in which it is almost unthinkable that “someone gets something for nothing”. This kind of common-sense thinking is widespread and it helps create our perfectly camouflaged blind spots that keep all unwelcome facts and unfamiliar ideas out of our sight (Tong, 2019). Basic income is not and should not be viewed as a silver bullet or panacea. “There are risks, unanswered question and major challenges attached to a UBIG” (Marais, 2022). Its success will depend on its design and wider political economy and public policy context. However, if designed and implemented carefully, it can change the lives of millions.

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