South Africa’s waves of protest and political violence are often explained through poverty, unemployment, and failures in service delivery.

In April 2026, Ivor Chipkin, Executive Director of the New South Institute, and Jelena Vidojević, NSI Co-Founder, published an analysis in The Conversation Africa arguing something more complex: elite political actors use protests as tools in their own power struggles. Their argument does not dismiss underlying grievances. Rather, it asks how those grievances are mobilised within contests for control of the ANC.

The research landed at a timely moment. Days earlier, South Africa had gazetted the Public Service Amendment Act — legislation that seeks to strengthen the professional management of the public service and clarify the boundary between political authority and administrative appointments. In that context, Chipkin and Vidojević’s argument about “gatekeeping” and patronage networks became especially relevant to understanding the institutional problem the reform is trying to address.

The research is being read widely

The article has circulated far beyond The Conversation‘s audience:

• South Africa’s mainstream press picked it up: TimesLIVE (27 April) republished the full piece for its national readership.
• Across Africa: African Insider, AllAfrica, and Modern Ghana distributed the analysis to readers in West and Southern Africa.
• International: Business-focused platforms like MENAFN and inkl reached policy and investment audiences globally.
• In German: RadioAfrika translated the entire article into German (“Gewaltätige Unruhen und politische Eliten“), extending the conversation to German-speaking policy communities in Europe.

That kind of reach — across continents, in multiple languages, and through a range of media and policy platforms — suggests that the research is speaking to a wider public concern: What drives South African protest? Why does violence spike and then recede? And what does civil service reform have to do with any of it?

What the research actually says

Here’s the core claim: Between 2013 and 2017, protest activity in South Africa fell sharply. But unemployment, inequality, and service delivery failures didn’t improve during that period—they worsened. So what suppressed protest?

Chipkin and Vidojević argue that Jacob Zuma’s government created what they call a “power elite” – a small, cohesive group able to make decisions that affect the whole country. In their account, this was sustained through corruption and patronage, including influence over appointments in government, state-owned enterprises, and the party itself.

After Cyril Ramaphosa became ANC president in December 2017, the mechanisms that had held this power elite together began to weaken. Without the same capacity to manage elite competition through patronage networks, the settlement fractured. Protests surged. Elite factions split off. The MK party was born.

The policy implication is that reducing elite-driven instability requires attention to the institutional mechanisms through which access to the state is controlled. The Public Service Amendment Act can be read in that context: as an effort to strengthen professional norms in the public service and clarify the boundary between political authority and administrative appointments.

Why this matters now

South Africa is implementing major governance reform. But you can’t evaluate whether that reform will work unless you understand the problem it’s trying to solve. That is where this research contributes: it argues that South African politics cannot be understood only through ideology or service delivery, but must also be read through elite competition for control of state resources.

If the research is right, the country’s trajectory depends on whether the Public Service Amendment Act actually gets implemented — and whether removing gatekeeping from the ANC will push elite competition into more dangerous directions (organized crime, armed factions) or into legitimate policy competition.

That’s not an abstract question. It affects stability, investment, and the daily lives of South Africans living with the consequences of institutional instability.

Read the full research

This research is part of the New South Institute’s long-standing work on state capacity, elite dynamics, and governance reform in South Africa.

The original article: The Conversation Africa

The peer-reviewed research: “Elite Contestation in South Africa, 2006–2018: The Making and Unmaking of a Power Elite”, Journal of Southern African Studies (February 2026)