Editor’s note: This article was originally published by TimesLIVE on 1 March 2026. Readers are encouraged to consult the original version on the TimesLIVE website.

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IVOR CHIPKIN | Public service reform could herald South Africa’s “third transition”
Bill curbs political control, aiming to professionalise administration and improve service delivery

The Public Service Administration Bill was passed by the National Council of Provinces on 4 November 2025. It now awaits the president’s assent to become law.

South Africa is on the cusp of what may be described as a third transition, one that seeks to rationalise and professionalise its public administration.

The Public Service Administration Bill (PSAB), which will divest politicians of control over key administrative tasks in government departments — especially the recruitment of civil servants and operational decision-making — was passed by the National Council of Provinces on 4 November last year. It now requires only presidential assent.

When the ANC came to power in 1994, it inherited multiple public administrations that it did not trust to implement its policies. The country had also been fragmented into a complex arrangement of self-governing territories and nominally independent states. Bophuthatswana, for example, had a public service of 65,000 people across 26 departments. Then deputy president Thabo Mbeki expressed concern that the civil service was not only resistant to direction from ANC ministers but could become a source of insurrection.

In this context, the ANC sought direct party-political control over the civil service. This was achieved by granting political executives — the president, cabinet ministers and members of provincial executive councils — authority over two key functions: recruitment and human resource management, and operational decisions. These powers were codified in the Public Service Act of 1994.

Executive authorities were given discretion to delegate these powers to senior departmental officials. They also retained the discretion not to do so, or to withdraw them.

The consequences of this blurring of political and administrative authority became evident over time. Senior officials were often unable to perform their duties without ministerial approval. Ministers interfered in departmental operations, blocked officials from carrying out their responsibilities, or appointed compliant individuals to senior posts.

The results were predictable. Directors-general and heads of department resigned, generating instability. Between 1998 and 2002, the Public Service Commission found that 62% of managers had changed positions within the public service. Although this later stabilised, it remained high at 32%. In 1998, a review by the Presidency concluded that departments were struggling to implement government policy, attributing this in part to the poor delineation between political and administrative roles. These warnings were not acted upon, and conditions deteriorated.

The failure to clearly distinguish between political and administrative offices produced three related problems: (i) the appointment of civil servants on the basis of loyalty rather than merit; (ii) departments lacking skilled and experienced officials; and (iii) high turnover and persistent vacancies in critical positions.

Taken together, these factors have undermined the effective functioning of government departments. It is in this context that the PSAB assumes significance.

The bill proposes removing executive authorities’ powers over human resource management within departments and their discretion over operational decisions. Politicians will no longer be permitted to appoint senior officials (with the exception of directors-general), nor will they be able to issue instructions concerning day-to-day administration. These responsibilities will instead be vested in senior officials.

The amendments clarify that the role of the political executive is to determine policy and to hold the administration accountable for its implementation. In this respect, the legislation moves towards establishing a relatively autonomous public administration in law.

The bill is not without criticism. It does not resolve the question of how officials should be appointed in practice. Some critics argue that it may consolidate the position of ANC-aligned officials at a time when the party faces sustained electoral decline. There is also a risk that, in an era of political volatility and coalition government, opposition parties may seek to repoliticise the civil service rather than proceed with institutional rationalisation.

If enacted, however, the bill will have immediate institutional effects, recalibrating power relations between politicians and officials.

Senior public servants will have greater authority to perform their functions, though this does not in itself guarantee improved performance. Many officials are political appointees. A significant number are approaching retirement age and may be primarily concerned with preserving pension entitlements rather than advancing reform.

What the legislation is likely to change, however, is the incentive structure within government. As administrative performance increasingly becomes an electoral issue, politicians face pressure to demonstrate effective service delivery.

Without the ability to intervene directly in departmental administration, the political class may be incentivised to support further reforms aimed at strengthening merit-based appointments and professional standards in the civil service.

In this sense, the legislation could encourage systemic rather than ad hoc reform across government. Should this occur, South Africa’s bureaucratic transition — what may be termed a “third transition” — will be under way.

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Ivor Chipkin is director of the New South Institute. He also teaches public policy at the Gordon Institute of Business Science.